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I. Introduction 
It seems indisputable today that environmental degradation, in general, and global warming, in 
particular, are a major cause of migration worldwide, which will increase in scope considerably in 
the next few years.1 Global warming may even lead to the disappearance of some island States, 
as sea levels rise.2 However, estimates regarding the number of people affected vary significantly,3 
which in no way diminishes the seriousness of the situation quantitatively (in a few years, the 
number of environmental refugees could be much higher than the number of people falling within 
the scope of the Geneva Convention) 4  or qualitatively – if it is taken into account that 
environmental degradation may affect vulnerable population groups (women, children, the sick and 
minorities) in particular. 
This observation raises the question of the extent to which current international law admits (has 
admitted) obligations relating to the prevention of situations giving rise to “environmental refugees” 
and/or the reaction thereto. The problem involves a whole range of issues. 5  This paper will 
therefore focus on aspects relating to the law of international responsibility and, more precisely, on 
the extent to which and conditions under which the recognized rules of State responsibility for 
wrongful acts are applicable in “environmental refugee” situations. However, as these “secondary” 
norms are closely linked to “primary” norms – which contain obligations with which States must 
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comply – it will be equally necessary to refer to primary norms to a certain extent. Therefore, we 
shall address the problem – following a short clarification of the concept of “environmental refugee” 
as understood in this paper (II) and a short reminder of the principles of international responsibility 
(III) – in relation to the potentially violated primary norms (IV.1) before considering two specific 
aspects of State responsibility in this context (IV.2). We shall conclude with a few remarks outlining 
the prospects for the development of international law on the subject (V).  
The analysis will focus, however, on issues regarding international responsibility for wrongful acts 
(therefore, conduct violating international law) and not on issues regarding the scope of the various 
State obligations; in other words, we shall concentrate in on the principles of international 
responsibility and not on the detailed interpretation of individual obligations. Furthermore, we shall 
not address international responsibility for lawful acts (State behaviour in accordance with 
international obligations), the role of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, 
and the potential implications of the application of the “responsibility to protect” concept. 6 
Therefore, we shall not discuss the institutional aspects (the institutions likely to contribute to 
solving expected problems and currently active in refugee, environmental and funding matters),7 
without denying their crucial importance. 
II. The concept of “environmental refugee” – definitions  
There is no official definition of “environmental refugee” in international law. On the contrary, quite 
different concepts exist,8 some of them even focusing on “climate refugees”, specifically excluding 
in certain cases, people who migrate because of environmental degradation for reasons other than 
global warming.9 
This is neither the place nor the time to review the entire discussion on this subject, particularly 
because the definition also depends on the objective and the context in which it is used. Therefore, 
it will merely be specified here that, drawing on UNEP’s 1985 definition, we understand 
“environmental refugees” to mean people forced to leave their residence temporarily or 
permanently on account of severe environmental degradation that seriously affects their living 
conditions or makes living in that region (almost) impossible or, at least, unbearable.10 That being 
the case, this definition includes only migration caused directly and primarily by environmental 
deterioration (due directly or indirectly to human behaviour or natural disaster). For example, in our 
opinion, the term “environmental refugees” applies in the following situations to: 
 persons fleeing because of a rise in sea level; 
 persons fleeing an extreme natural disaster (e.g. a hurricane); 
 persons fleeing following a major accident (e.g. of industrial origin) that makes living in the 
particular region almost impossible or unbearable; 
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 According to this concept, in cases of serious and apparent violations of human rights within a State, the 
international community, the United Nations Security Council and/or third States should (be able to) intervene to 
protect people affected, by resorting to the use of force if the situation so requires. For the importance of the 
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 See Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, UNEP, 1985, 4: “Environmental refugees are defined as those 
people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked 
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously 
affected the quality of life.” For elements for a definition, see further Zerger, ZAR 2009 (note 1), 84 (88), who, for 
the most part, agrees with the definition proposed in this paper. 
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 persons fleeing because environmental degradation – for example, owing to water scarcity 
or inability to cultivate fields – leads to living conditions that make survival difficult or 
impossible in the region of origin.  
However, it should be noted that migration is generally the result of many factors. The matter 
cannot be examined in detail in this paper; our reflection will be limited to individual cases in which 
a decisive link can be established between environmental degradation and migration, the 
establishment of this link being problematic and not the subject of discussion below.  
Although “environmental refugees” are obviously not refugees within the meaning of the Geneva 
Convention,11 we believe that it is justifiable to use the term “refugee” in the environmental context. 
Indeed, the threats faced by affected persons – based on the elements of the definition provided – 
are in fact comparable to those faced by persons considered “refugees” under the Geneva 
Convention. That said, use of the term “environmental refugees”, “environmental migrants”, 
“environmentally displaced persons” or any other is in no way prejudicial to these person’s legal 
status. Ultimately, it is simply a matter of definitions. 
III. International responsibility of States for wrongful acts – principles  
The rules governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts have developed 
over the years 12  and today, the principles set out in the articles formulated in 2001 by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) – and noted by the United Nations General Assembly took 
note13 – seem for the most part to be recognized by States as falling under customary international 
law, although questions on some aspects of these articles are still controversial. The difficulty 
regarding international responsibility lies, in this context, not in the question of whether or not a 
particular principle of international responsibility has been recognized as being part of customary 
international law, but rather in being able to apply the principles of international responsibility within 
the framework of the (legal) problems raised by the issue of environmental refugees. 
This paper therefore merely outlines the main thrusts of the principles governing international 
responsibility – that is, the rules that determine the conditions, content and consequences of State 
responsibility for wrongful acts (“secondary norms”) which must be distinguished from “primary 
norms” which contain State obligations under international law. 14  In this regard, the following 
principles, based on the ILC Articles, should be mentioned.15 
– The principle of responsibility: all States are responsible for the breach of an international 
law obligation. In other words, every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State (Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles).16 
– The international responsibility of a State is subject to two conditions (Article 2 of the ILC 
Draft Articles):  
                                                 
11
 The Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, RS 0.142.30, and the Protocol of 31 January 
1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, RS 0.142.301. Under article 1A, the term “refugee” may apply only to 
persons who fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. As such the “classic” legal regime in international law on refugees cannot be applied to 
environmental refugees. For details, see Cournil, Revue du droit public 2006 (note 1), 1035 (1041 ff.). A similar 
view is given, for example, in Lassailly-Jacob, REDE 2006 (note 1), 374 (378); Christel Cournil/Pierre Mazzega, 
Catastrophes écologiques et flux migratoires: comment protéger les “réfugiés écologiques”?, REDE 2006, 418 
(419). 
12
 For principles of international responsibility, see for instance (in addition to the relevant chapters in the various 
international law books) Andreas Felder, Die Beihilfe im Recht der völkerrechtlichen Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 
2007, 46 ff.; Katja S. Ziegler, Fluchtverursachung als völkerrechtliches Delikt. Die völkerrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit des Herkunftsstaates für die Verursachung von Fluchtbewegungen, 2002, 85 ff. 
13
 United Nations document. A/Res./56/83. 
14
 For this distinction, see Astrid Epiney, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten für rechtswidriges 
Verhalten im Zusammenhang mit Aktionen Privater, 1992, 25 ff. 
15
 See references in notes 12 and 13. 
16
 See Permanent International Court of Justice (PCJI), the Chorzow Factory case (1927), PCJI, Series A; No 8, 21. 
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 first, if the act or omission must be attributable to the State, that is, it must be 
considered State conduct. Articles 4 ff. of the ILC articles specify the conditions of 
attribution of conduct to a State. In principle, only the conduct of State organs 
(Article 4) or of persons or entities empowered by the State to exercise elements of 
governmental authority (Articles 5 and 6) may be attributed to that particular State. 
Article 8 ff. addresses specific questions, in particular State responsibility for “de facto 
organs” (Article 8); 
 second, if the act or omission17 thus attributable to the State constitutes a breach of 
an international obligation of that State; This means that there must be a “wrongful 
act”. All international law obligations incumbent upon States at the time of the act 
must be taken into account, regardless of their source – customary law, an 
international treaty or any other source of international law (see Article 12 ff. of the 
ILC Articles for details).  
– “Injury” beyond that caused “automatically” by each breach of international law is not 
required for finding that a case of international responsibility exists.  
– Similarly, there is no requirement to show any “fault” whatsoever in order to establish 
international responsibility.  
– Articles 20 ff. of the ILC Articles identify circumstances in which State responsibility is 
precluded even though the conditions under Article 2 are met.  
– Articles 28 ff. of the ILC Articles codify the content of States’ international responsibility. In 
the context of this paper, it is particularly important to highlight that reparation (see for 
example the wording of Articles 31 and 34 ff. of the ILC Articles) will be made only for the 
injury caused by a wrongful act, in other words, the consequences of the wrongful act, 
which means that a casual link is required.  
These general principles of State responsibility are applicable in the context considered here. 
Indeed, Article 55 of the ILC Articles provides that specific obligations under special rules shall be 
applicable only to the extent that they govern the questions of responsibility under discussion. 
However, it can also be inferred from this article that the existence of special rules do not exclude, 
in principle, the use of the general principles unless the specific rules are genuinely considered a 
“self-contained regime”, which is, all things considered, an exception. Be that as it may, the 
provisions regarding the consequences of non-compliance with State obligations contained in the 
texts of international environmental law and international human rights law cannot be considered 
exhaustive since the mechanisms provided are generally too weak for it to be considered that they 
preclude the application of the general principles of State responsibility.18 
IV. State responsibility for “environmental refugees” 
Currently, there is no specific legal instrument regulating the legal situation of environmental 
refugees or involving States’ obligations in their regard or concerning prevention obligations.19 For 
this reason, we have directed our reflection to the scope which can be given to a number of non-
specific international obligations (with regard to State responsibility for causing situations 
promoting the emergence of environmental refugees). We shall first demonstrate (1) that 
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 An omission is always particularly important if international law admits obligations to act under certain conditions. 
Some aspects of this issue will be discussed in Part IV. 
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 In the same vein with regard to international environmental law, see Voigt, NJIL 2008 (note 2), 1 (3 f.). With 
regard to human rights, see Bruno Simma, Human Rights and State Responsibility, in: A. Reinisch/U. Kriebaum 
(ed.), The Law of International Relations – Liber Amicorum Hanspter Neuhold, 2007, 359 (365). 
19
 Only Cournil, Revue du droit public 2006 (note 1), 1035 (1040). 
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international obligations do exist,20 which may be particularly important in the context of this paper, 
because they require States to adopt conduct that is (also) supposed to prevent the emergence of 
environmental refugees. These are the primary norms that are potentially relevant in this context. 
We shall then focus on (2) questions common to a certain number of these primary norms which 
arise in the context of (potential) State responsibility for causing migratory flows. Therefore, as 
mentioned above,21 we shall highlight aspects of international responsibility, the interpretation of 
primary rules not being the subject of our reflection, apart from some specific aspects relating to 
the environmental refugee problem. 
1. Relevant international obligations (primary norms) 
In our view, a breach of the following international obligations may have a “causal” link to 
environmental refugees: (a) human rights obligations, (b) international treaty obligations, 
(c) customary law obligations and lastly, (d) State responsibility for environmental refugee flows. 
However, in our opinion, a general obligation (independently of a violation of international law) on 
States to assist other States that cannot cope with major difficulties, that is, in this context, States 
that cannot take preventive, precautionary or adaptive measures to deal with the environmental 
refugee problem, is not admissible. Currently in international law, there is no general obligation to 
assist other States.  
(a) Human rights 
Binding international texts on human rights – only the 1966 Universal Covenants will be 
considered here22 – do not provide for any rights relating to a “healthy environment” or any 
specific rights regarding the protection of human beings in the event of serious damage to 
the environment. However, a number of rights guaranteed by the Covenants may be of some 
significance where there is environmental damage. Mention may be made, in particular, of 
the following rights guaranteed by one of the 1966 Covenants: 
 Article 12, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Covenant II) provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his 
own country. When environmental degradation is such that persons affected must leave 
their region of origin and go abroad, this right may come into play. Similarly, this may 
prove important should a State disappear on account of a rise in sea level; 
 Article 6, paragraph 1, of Covenant II enshrines a right to life. This right is protected 
under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court 
of Human Rights has developed in respect of Article 2 and Article 8 of the Convention 
(protection of private life) case law enabling persons to enforce these rights in 
connection with environmental degradation on a certain scale. 23  Environmental 
degradation can effectively threaten people’s lives and may even cause their death; 
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 Specific Community law issues will not be addressed in this paper. However, it should be underlined that 
Community law currently has no specific instrument on refugees, although Council Directive D 2001/55 on 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the 
consequences thereof (OJ 2001 L 212, 7), may also apply to environmental refugees. See Cournil, Revue du droit 
public 2006 (note 1), 1035 (1052 ff.). 
21
  See introduction (I). 
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  However, it should be recalled that regional human rights texts may also be very relevant in the context of this 
paper. The European Court of Human Rights rendered several opinion on the issue of the conditions under which 
some rights under the European Convention on Human Rights could be important in regard to environmental 
issues. See references in note 23. 
23
  See the Court’s (Grand Chamber) judgement of 30 November 2004, Öneryildic/Turkey, No. 48939/99; the Court’s 
judgement of 20 March 2008, Budayeva/Russia, No. 15339/02. For details on the scope of the ECHR as regards 
prejudice to the environment, see Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Das Umweltrecht in der Rechtsprechung des 
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 Article 12, paragraph 1, of Covenant II provides that all persons are free to choose their 
residence, and that right could be curtailed on account of environmental degradation;  
 Article 11, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Covenant I) recognizes everyone’s right to adequate food. As a result of 
environmental degradation, it may become harder, or even impossible, for some people 
to feed themselves properly.  
These rights – as other human rights – put states under (at least) two “categories of 
obligations”:24 (a) first, the obligation for the State to refrain from certain courses of conduct; 
(b) second, the obligation to take protective measures under certain conditions. Lastly, 
(c) the question arises of whether an obligation not to deny entry can be inferred from these 
rights. 
(aa) Obligation to refrain from certain actions 
In the context of this paper, the obligation to refrain from conduct that violates or may 
violate human rights may be important in cases in which the State itself – through acts 
attributable to it under the principles of State responsibility 25  – causes environmental 
degradation that triggers migration. For example, certain State conduct leading to 
environmental degradation thus infringing one or more of the above-mentioned rights may 
include continuation by a State of a major industrial project that seriously damages a 
region’s environment and consequently endangers the life or health of a number of people. 
This obligation therefore serves to prevent environmental degradation that may trigger 
migratory flows (within a country or towards other countries). Consequently, it is incumbent 
upon the State to refrain from such conduct, although the exact scope of human rights in 
regard to State actions detrimental to the quality of the environment has not yet been 
determined. 
All the same, the scope of this obligation is limited in the context of this paper: 
 First, it only concerns acts by the State itself. However, environmental degradation is 
caused most often by private individuals. 
 Second, there are often several causes of environmental degradation in a given region. 
It is therefore often impossible to pinpoint a specific and “isolated” State cut as the sole 
or primary reason for the environmental degradation, and by extension, for migratory 
flows of environmental refugees.26 
(bb) States’ obligation to take protective measures  
Under human rights laws States are under an obligation not only to refrain from actions that 
violate these rights, but also to take adequate measures to prevent other people (in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, NVwZ 2007, 25 ff.; Sebastian Heselhaus/Thilo Marauhn, 
Strassburger Springprozession zum Schutz der Umwelt: ökologische Menschenrechte nach den “Hatton”-
Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, EuGRZ 2005, 549 ff.; Loukis Loucaides, 
Environmental protection through the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights, BYIL 2004, 
249 ff.; Muriel Merino, Protection de l’individu contre les nuisances environnementales: de la jurisprudence de la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme au système juridictionnel national de protection, Revue trimestrielle des 
droits de l’homme 2006, 55 ff. 
24
  State obligations only will be considered here, since it is generally recognized that human rights obligations are 
addressed primarily to States. 
25
  See Article 4 ff. of the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, United Nations 
Document. A/Res./56/83. Regarding doctrine, see for example Felder, Beihilfe im Recht der völkerrechtlichen 
Staatenverantwortlichkeit (note 12), 46 ff.; Ziegler, Fluchtverursachung (note 12), 85 ff. 
26
  See details on the chain of causation under IV.2 (b). 
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particular private individuals) and events (natural) from infringing these rights.27 As a result, 
this aspect of the scope of human rights requires States to intervene if it is feared with a 
measure of probability that a human right may be breached.28 However, the obligation here 
is merely an “obligation of due diligence”. Therefore, the State must be aware of the risk of 
infringement of a human right. This condition is fulfilled if it is considered that the State 
could have been made aware by using the precautionary criteria adapted to the situation. 
Similarly, the measures to be taken are those warranted by the circumstances to prevent a 
breach of human rights. This entails an obligation of conduct and not of result.29 
This obligation may involve States in which environmental deterioration occurs (States of 
origin) and third States. 
(1) States of origin 
In all situations in which environmental degradation is such that affected persons risk 
losing their lives or being deprived of food necessary for their survival, and are 
consequently forced to leave their homes, the State in which these vulnerable 
populations live must, in principle (if the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled) take 
appropriate measures (for example, warn of natural disasters, minimize environmental 
degradation or enable affected populations to leave the region in question in order to 
settle elsewhere within the State), even in cases where the State itself has not caused 
the environmental degradation. 
However, the scope of this principle is somewhat limited regarding migration due to 
environmental degradation, because of strict conditions regulating States’ obligation to 
take protective measures. 
– First, it should be noted that in many situations, preventive or adaptive measures 
cannot (adequately) prevent environmental degradation that triggers migration 
and are simply not at all apt to prevent environmental deterioration. This is 
especially the case for a whole range of consequences linked to global warming 
such as the rise in sea levels, extreme natural events and water scarcity in certain 
regions owing to desertification. Furthermore, even preventive and adaptive 
measures demanded by the circumstances that usually should prevent 
environmental degradation often do not suffice. In other words, they simply cannot 
prevent environmental degradation in all cases. For example, dykes are built to 
prevent flooding, but they may not hold if the water rises higher than expected (for 
example because of unusual winds).  
– Second, certain events that cause environmental degradation cannot be foreseen. 
– Lastly, it must above all be noted that States are only obliged to take measures as 
required under the due diligence standard. Therefore, States should generally 
                                                 
27
  See Walter Kälin/Jörg Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz, 2nd ed., 2008, 118 ff.; Joerg Künzli, Zwischen 
Rigidität und Flexibilität: Der Verpflichtungsgrad internationaler Menschenrechte. Ein Beitrag zum Zusammenspiel 
von Menschenrechten, humanitärem Völkerrecht und dem Recht der Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 2001, 215 ff.; 
Manfred Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed., 2005, Art. 2, 
No. 3 ff.; Eckart Klein, The Duty to Protect and to Ensure Human Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, in: Eckart Klein (ed.), The Duty to Protect and to Ensure Human Rights, 2000, 295 (298 ff.); 
Thilo Rensmann, Die Humanisierung des Völkerrechts durch das ius in bello – Von der Martens’schen Klausel zur 
“Responsibility to Protect”, ZaöRV 2008, 111 (116 ff.); Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: 
Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, HRQ 1998, 81 ff.; Astrid 
Epiney, Sustainable Use of Freshwater Resources, ZaöRV 2003, 377 (389). 
28
  For the right to life, see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg of 30 November 2004 
(Grand Chamber), Öneryildic/Turkey, No. 48939/99. In this judgment, the Court recognized that State 
responsibility may be engaged because adequate protective measures were not taken and it specified the 
conditions for such a responsibility. 
29
  For more on due diligence obligations, see IV.2 (a). 
– 8 – 
have a legislative and administrative system that enables them to take appropriate 
measures should there be a threat of infringement of human rights. However, 
obligations which they are unable to fulfil may not be formulated.30 If a State lacks 
the financial and technological resources necessary to take the preventive or 
adaptive measures required, in principle, it may not objectively be held 
responsible under international law for not taking such measures.31 Furthermore, if 
it is taken into account that most situations involving environmental refugees arise 
in countries of the South, in particular Africa and Asia,32 the de jure and de facto 
limitations of States’ obligation to take sufficient protective and adaptive measures 
become evident. 
(2) Third States 
Nonetheless, the question remains as to the extent to which other States or some of 
them (that is, third States, not the State on whose territory the environmental 
degradation and “environmental migration” take place) are obliged under international 
law to take some protective measures. Thus third States that themselves contribute to 
environmental degradation in other countries or fail to take appropriate action to prevent 
such behaviour by private parties might be obliged to desist from such actions or to take 
appropriate steps to prevent private parties from committing such acts. One such 
example might be the major part that the industrialized countries play, through 
greenhouse gas emissions, in climate warming and thereby in environmental 
degradation in some other countries (especially those of the South). Another might be 
where State or private activities in one State jeopardize some of the aforesaid human 
rights.  
However, such an obligation only takes effect for a third State if it can be established 
clearly that acts committed on the third State’s territory is indeed the chief cause of the 
environmental degradation and, thereby, of a violation of one or more of the aforesaid 
human rights and the cause of migratory flows: it is the causal relationship which is 
central in this context.33 If the third State in question merely contributes “slightly” to 
environmental degradation in another State, the current state of international human 
rights law does not allow such an obligation to be upheld since, in principle, the prime 
and sole responsibility rests with the State of origin. In this instance, any human rights 
aspect does not materially add to the general obligation not to cause significant 
ecological damage on the territory of other States. Nonetheless, where there has been 
a violation both of this general rule of public international law34 and of a human right 
obligation, that aspect might take on a measure of importance in view of the relatively 
strong enforcement machinery in the field of human rights. 
Be that as it may, we believe that a third State’s responsibility cannot be repudiated on 
the sole grounds that it has no effective control on the territory of the State of origin. 
True, as a general rule the State of origin bears the chief responsibility for ensuring 
respect for human rights on its territory. However, to the extent that human rights are 
jeopardized following an action or omission by a third State, we find that there is no 
argument that allows the applicability of human rights to be repudiated, regardless of 
                                                 
30
  See further under IV.2 (a). 
31
  With regard to details on these principles, see further Epiney, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten 
(note 14), 217 ff. 
32
  See Jean-Jacques Gouguet, Réfugiés écologiques: un débat controversé, REDE 2006, 381 (382 ff.). 
33
  In this regard see IV.2 (b) below. 
34
  In this regard see also the comments under IV.1 (d) 
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extraterritoriality. States are bound by human rights in respect of all State behaviour 
whether or not some effects of that behaviour are felt in other States.35 
(cc) Prohibition of denial of entry 
Finally, one last question should be considered in respect of obligations that may derive 
from human rights: whether a principle of non-denial of entry can be deduced from human 
rights. 
It has been established by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg that Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) forbids 
States to extradite persons to another State in which they may be subjected to treatment 
contravening that Article.36 Similarly, the Court recognized that the prohibition of expulsion 
was also applicable if the right to life (ECHR Article 2) might be violated in the destination 
country.37 As to the scope of Pact II, it would appear that the Human Rights Committee also 
recognizes, similarly, such a prohibition of denial of entry, at least in cases where torture is 
to be feared in the destination State.38 
If these principles are applied to ecological refugees, then two situations may be 
distinguished. 
 If environmental deterioration were to result in a threat to the lives of persons and 
their flight, and if their return to their State of origin might plausibly endanger them, 
then the principle of non-denial of entry should arguably also apply. This situation is 
analogous to the situations in which the lives of the persons concerned are 
threatened by the State of origin itself, through its agents; in such situations, the 
principle of non-denial of entry is accepted. For the persons concerned, and more 
generally in respect of the extent of the right-to-life obligation, the precise origin of the 
threat to life should have no impact on the scope of the prohibition of denial of entry 
which governs States’ obligations regarding the protection of life in general.39 That 
being so, although the principle of non-denial of entry has not to our knowledge yet 
been applied in the context of environmental degradation likely to endanger the lives 
of persons, it is considered that such a prohibition may be deduced, in the 
circumstances stated here, from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
and of the Human Rights Committee. 
 If, conversely, lives are not in danger but living conditions have “merely” deteriorated 
to the point where people nonetheless leave their region of origin, international 
practice has to our knowledge not yet recognized explicitly an obligation to respect a 
principle of non-denial of entry. In particular, cases of danger to health, food and/or 
basic livelihood come to mind.40 Now, the same arguments may be advanced in 
                                                 
35
  With regard to this entire problem, see Kälin/Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz (Universal Human Rights 
Protection) (note 27), 142 ff. 
36
  See the European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. United Kingdom, Series A 161 No. 14038/88. For the 
doctrine see Martina Caroni, Die Praxis des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte im Bereich des 
Ausländer- und Asylrechts, in: Achermann/Epiney/Kälin/Nguyen (ed.), Annuaire du droit de la migration 
2004/2005, 2005, 191 ff; Martina Caroni, Die Praxis des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte im 
Bereich des Ausländer- und Asylrechts, in: Achermann/Epiney/Kälin/Nguyen (ed.), Annuaire du droit de la 
migration 2005/2006, 2006, 187 ff; Kälin/Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz (note 27), 550 ff. 
37
  European Court of Human Rights, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, Rep. 1998-I, No. 78. 
38
  See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20 (1992), No. 9; Human Rights Committee, C. v. Australia, 
900/1999 (2002), No. 8.5. 
39
  For instance, the European Court of Human Rights recognizes that the principle of non-denial of entry also 
applies where private groups threaten the persons concerned, see European Court of Human Rights, H.L.R. v. 
France, Rep. 1997-III. 
40
  Except for exceptional cases of prohibition of denial of entry due to inadequate medical provision in the country of 
origin: in this regard see with other references, particularly to the case of law, Kälin/Künzli, Universeller 
Menschenrechtsschutz (note 27), 551 ff. 
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respect of the right to food or a livelihood as for the right to life, with the consequence 
that return to the State of origin is prohibited where a threat to the achievement of 
those rights is perforce entailed. 
In sum, it may be concluded that an obligation of non-denial of entry arises in all cases where 
return to the State of origin would jeopardize the achievement of human rights, including 
cases where the jeopardy stems from environmental degradation. 
Nonetheless, the practical scope of such an obligation should not be overestimated, since it 
applies only in international relations.41 Firstly, it presupposes above all – as noted – that 
return to the country of origin (probably) perforce entails a risk to the human right in question 
(right to life, right to food, etc.). Furthermore, in many cases the persons concerned are able 
to settle in other regions of their State of origin. Moreover, even where the prohibition of 
denial of entry applies, the status conferred under international law is very insecure: the only 
claim, for the time being is that there is a right to remain in the destination country; on the 
other hand, no other obligations relating to residence may be deduced from current 
international law (other than respect for human rights).  
(b) Obligations relating to protection of the environment and climate deriving from 
international treaties 
States must respect obligations under international treaties in force for them (Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Consequently they must account – where 
appropriate in compliance with the procedures established under the treaty in question – for 
any violation of such a contractual obligation and must reinstate the status quo ante or, if that 
is not possible, repair the damage to the extent possible.42 
In this paper it is not possible to examine the scope of the host of international conventions 
for protection of the environment and climate. However, one “cross-cutting” question of 
particular importance in this context is whether the various obligations enshrined in 
international conventions (such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol thereto, or the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution) comprise, together with protection of the environment per se, the prevention of 
migratory flows due to environmental degradation. This question matters above all in the 
context of remedies for a violation of international law. If indeed the answer is affirmative, 
remedies will consist not only in restoring the previous situation but also in “repairing” the 
consequences of migratory flows, which could lead to considerable cost. 
Although it is not possible to analyse all texts that may bear on this problem, it can be stated 
that it is not explicitly clear from the international conventions on the environment or on 
climate change that they also aim to prevent persons from being forced to leave their places 
of residence because of environmental degradation or climate change. However, the implicit 
or explicit objective of these conventions is also to protect the environment and so to 
guarantee that the natural basis for people’s survival and quality of life is sustainably 
protected. Consequently, it is considered that the international conventions on the 
environment and particularly on climate change also aim, at least implicitly, to prevent people 
from being compelled to flee because of environmental degradation or climate change. 
Consequently, remedies for non-fulfilment of those obligations may in principle also include 
costs in respect of the creation of migratory flows. Nonetheless, the question of the extent to 
which a State’s violation of its obligations may indeed be considered to have caused 
migratory flows will arise regularly. Since this is a problem common to various primary norms 
                                                 
41
  In cases of internal migration, the State concerned must take appropriate measures of protection, see IV.1 (a) 
(bb) above. 
42
  See III above, the principles of the responsibility of States.  
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that may potentially play a part in the context of ecological refugees and, moreover, touch on 
basic principles of the law of the responsibility of States, it will be discussed below.43 
In any event, no international responsibility on the basis of violation of international 
conventions on the environment or climate change may arise if the State in question has 
respected its commitments arising under a particular convention, even if migratory flows 
occur because of environmental degradation or climate change. 
(c) Obligations under customary international law: the “Trail Smelter” principle 
According to the Trail Smelter case law,44 a State must prevent significant ecological damage 
from arising in other States due to activities on its territory or, should such damage arise, 
must “repair” the consequences of such damage (no-harm rule). This obligation is regardless 
of the legality or otherwise of the activity concerned: in other words, States are under an 
obligation to prevent ecological damage from arising in other States even if it arises from 
activities that are in essence legal. 45  This principle is undeniably part of customary 
international law, 46  although, admittedly, it does not figure very largely in international 
practice even in cases where the conditions for its application have undoubtedly been met.47 
The conditions in which this obligation arises are as follows:48 
– significant environmental damage must have arisen in another State (not necessarily a 
neighbouring State) Furthermore, States must avoid even the danger of such damage 
arising, although this principle does not imply the prohibition per se of particularly 
dangerous activities – ultra-hazardous activities. It is therefore an obligation in respect of 
behaviour and not of result; 
– the activity causing such environmental damage may consist equally of an act or an 
omission of State. In the latter case, which is particularly important in this regard, the 
State is responsible for the environmental damage if it fails to take appropriate 
measures, depending on circumstances (due diligence) to prevent the damage being 
caused by private parties;49 
– the State behaviour at issue must be the cause of the environmental harm; a causal link 
must therefore be shown;50  
– only significant or considerable damage must be avoided. This requirement is generally 
met if the environmental degradation is such that persons leave their place of 
residence.51 
(d) The responsibility of States for causing environmental refugee flows 
                                                 
43
  See IV.2 (b). 
44
  See RIAA III 1905. With regard to this principle see Astrid Epiney, Das „Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender 
Umweltbeeinträchtigungen“: Relikt oder konkretisierungsfähige Grundnorm? ArchVR 1995, 309 ff. 
45
  Inter alia see Voigt, NJIL 2008 (note 2), 1 (8 ff); T. Scouvazzim, State responsibility for Environmental Harm, 
YbIEL 2001, 49 ff. 
46
  The ICJ also refers to this principle, see cases on nuclear armaments and on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 
ICJ Rep. 1996, 241, para. 29; ICJ Rep. 1997, 7, para. 41. 
47
  For example, the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1987. 
48
  For a detailed account, see Astrid Epiney, Umweltvölkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für Entwicklungsprojekte, 
in: Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis, BerDGV 41, Heidelberg 2005, 329 (344 ff); Epiney, ArchVR 
1995 (note 44), 309 ff. 
49
  See definition of these due diligence obligations at IV.2 (a) below. 
50
  See IV.2 (b) below. 
51
  In the same vein, with regard to the environmental consequences of climate change, see Voigt, NJIL 2008 
(note 2), 1 (9). 
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If environmental degradation is the (predominant) cause of a refugee flow towards other 
States, the question arises as to the extent to which a State may be held responsible for 
causing (in some way) that flow of refugees and to the extent to which a State (and which 
one) should take measures, in particular environmental protection measures, to prevent such 
a flow of refugees and/or to restore the situation so that the persons concerned may return 
home. 
In general, there are solid arguments in favour of making States internationally accountable 
for causing migratory flows, whatever their cause:52 the fact of triggering migratory flows may 
in particular constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the State to which the refugees 
emigrate. The latter is at least de facto compelled to receive the refugees and, as a result, 
triggering an outflow of refugees violates the sovereign right of each State freely to decide 
whether or not it wishes to admit persons of foreign nationality on its soil. The State must, 
however, be found to be genuinely responsible for having caused these migratory flows. In 
other words, an act imputable to the State must be the root cause of the migratory flows. This 
is notably the case when a State systematically violates human rights, so causing part of its 
population to seek refuge in another State. Conversely, if the migratory flows stem, for 
example, from acts of violence by private parties and if the State has taken action as may 
reasonably be expected to prevent such acts (due diligence), no behaviour in violation of an 
international legal obligation may be imputed to the State.53 Further, a State may be held 
responsible only if the persons concerned may no longer reasonably be expected to remain 
in their region of origin; it is nonetheless not necessary for them to be (physically) compelled 
to flee. Finally, a causal link must be established between the factor triggering the migratory 
flow and the violation of sovereignty. It can only be recognized if the destination of migration 
is clear, that is, if, reasonably, only one migration route is available to those affected. If, 
conversely, the refugees have the choice of several destinations, the causal link cannot be 
recognized.  
These principles – which can only be outlined here – may also be applicable in the particular 
case of persons leaving their region of origin because of environmental degradation. The 
conditions under which such State responsibility and obligations obtain should, nonetheless, 
be noted. 
– Firstly, the refugees must be genuinely environmental, which means that they cannot 
reasonably be expected to remain in their region of origin as a result of environmental 
degradation. 
– Secondly, a State act or omission must be the cause of the aforesaid environmental 
degradation. With regard to the State on whose territory the environmental degradation 
took place, this condition is fulfilled only if that State itself is the cause of the 
environmental degradation or, where the cause of the degradation lies with private 
parties or where it results from a natural disaster without (direct) human influence, if the 
State has neglected to take the preventive action appropriate to the circumstances (due 
diligence).54 Thus the two facets of States’ obligations (the obligation to refrain and the 
obligation to prevent) deriving from human rights and already mentioned above are to 
be found here. 55  Other States (third States) may be considered to have caused 
                                                 
52
  See in particular the detailed studies by Alberto Achermann, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit 
fluchtverursachender Staaten. Ein Beitrag zum Zusammenwirken von Flüchtlingsrecht, Menschenrechten, 
kollektiver Friedenssicherung und Staatenverantwortlichkeit 1997, 175 ff; Ziegler, Fluchtverursachung (note 12), 
401 ff. 
53
  With regard to the imputing of an act to the State in this context, see the detailed account by Achermann, 
Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fluchtverursachender Staaten (note 52), 147 ff. 
54
  In the same vein see Agnès Michelot-Draft, Enjeux de la reconnaissance du statut de réfugié écologique pour la 
construction d’une nouvelle responsabilité internationale, REDE 2006, 427 (433, 437); Chemillier-Gendreau, 
REDE 2006 (note 1), 446 (447). With regard to the standard of due diligence see IV.2.a) below. 
55
  See IV.1 (a). 
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migratory flows only if a causal link is established between their behaviour and the 
environmental degradation in the State of origin of the environmental refugees and, 
thus, of the flow of refugees.56 
– Thirdly, as mentioned above, there must be a causal link between the migratory flow 
and the violation of the other State’s sovereignty, which can only be recognized in 
situations where in essence there is only one “migratory route”. 
On the whole, it may be concluded that States are obliged to refrain, under the conditions 
listed above, from triggering migratory flows towards other States and, therefore, should that 
obligation be violated, then the State in question may be held internationally accountable. In 
this context, such instances may include, for example a State systematically destroying a 
population’s natural environment or failing to take measures against such action on the part 
of private parties, such that the population is obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring State. 
Nonetheless, there are many situations in which the aforesaid conditions are not met, for 
whatever reason (notably the lack of a causal link between the migratory flow and the 
violation of the other State’s sovereignty or a migratory flow not caused by State behaviour). 
Furthermore, this obligation only creates a link between the environmental refugees’ State of 
origin and State of destination and does not require the protection of the persons concerned 
per se. 
2. Issues under the law of international responsibility 
This outline of the various primary obligations that may in theory be invoked if a State causes 
environmental refugee movement also highlighted two issues that arise with regard to the primary 
standards: (a) first, the question of the standard of “due diligence” and, (b) second, the causal link 
between State behaviour and outflows of environmental refugees. 
(a) The standard of “due diligence” 
This issue arises in particular with regard to the obligations of States in respect of acts by 
private parties. States may indeed not be held responsible for the activities of private parties 
as such (since the acts of private parties may not be imputed) but they are obliged (under 
primary norms) to take protective or preventive action as required in the circumstances.57 
That being so, the question arises as to how the standard of “due diligence” can be defined. 
Although the principle of applying the standard of “due diligence” appears to be largely 
recognized in practice, there is less clarity as to the exact criteria to be used in determining 
whether or not the standard has been respected. However, on the strength of international 
practice,58 a few general principles may be identified: 
– Firstly, it should be stressed that States can in principle only be expected to take action 
that they can effectively take. In other words, under their international obligations they 
are not compelled to apply a standard if they cannot take the necessary measures to do 
                                                 
56
  In this regard see IV.2 (b) below. 
57
  See IV.1 above. 
58
  See in detail with other references Epiney, Die völkerrechtliche Veranwortlichkeit (note 14), 211 ff. See also R. 
Verheyen, Climate Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State responsibilities, 2005, 174, which 
describes the standard of due diligence as the behaviour to be expected of a “good government“. Another author 
stresses that due diligence must be ascertained in the light of the resources and capabilities available to the State 
in an international context, see Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the 
Eve of a New Century, RdC 1999, 280. For its part the  International Law Commission (ILC) has defined the 
standard of “due diligence” in its commentary on articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities as follows: “… to take unilateral measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at 
any event minimize the risk of thereof … Such measures include, first, formulating policies designed to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or to minimize the risk thereof and, second implementing those policies. Such 
policies are expressed in legislation and administrative regulations and implemented through various enforcement 
mechanisms.” ILC Rep., 53rd session, Commentary, 393. 
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so. In such circumstances they are unable to guarantee such a standard so that there 
can be no question of appropriate measures. In other words, obligations that States 
cannot fulfil may not be established. That being so, if a State does not have the requisite 
financial and technological resources to take the preventive or adaptive measures that 
are in principle objectively appropriate in order to avoid outflows of environmental 
refugees, it cannot be held accountable in international law for failing to do so. However, 
if the State’s inability to react in specific circumstances is the outcome of its failure to 
maintain a State organization sufficient to discharge its various preventive obligations, 
the State’s responsibility must be recognized. Indeed, States are generally required to 
be organized in such a way as to be able to fulfil their international obligations. In other 
words, States are obliged to maintain “sound government”.59 
If these principles are applied to State responsibility for environmental refugees, then it 
stands to reason that the States of the North should in general be considered capable of 
taking the preventive and protective measures that the circumstances objectively 
require. They do have adequate financial and technological resources and there is 
nothing to justify any mitigation of their accountability on grounds of inability to act. 
Conversely, in regard to the behaviour of a State of the South (especially that of an 
African or Asian State), detailed analysis is required of whether it can reasonably be 
expected to take specific measures to protect and adapt. There is no doubt that some 
particularly poor States cannot be compelled to take action that lies outside their 
capability. Nonetheless, specific analysis is required as to whether that is or is not the 
case. Furthermore, States are in principle obliged to accept foreign aid where that can 
contribute to the necessary measures of protection and adaptation being taken. Where 
such aid is refused without objective reason, States are failing to respect their due-
diligence obligations. 
– The standard of due diligence must be ascertained in the circumstances of each 
individual case and obligation. All factors that may be of importance in the context of the 
obligation in question must be taken into account. In the context of obligations to prevent 
flows of ecological refugees, the following (non-exhaustive) factors seem particularly 
important: 
– It is not necessary for the causal link between a certain behaviour and a significant 
environmental degradation to be beyond doubt. Under the precautionary principle, it 
suffices for that link to exist with a measure of scientific evidence for States to be obliged 
where appropriate to take the preventive measures that the circumstances require. This 
being so, for example, it suffices for greenhouse gases to be the cause of climate 
change to a high degree of probability. 
– The environmental degradation should be foreseable. In other words, it should 
reasonably be possible, using established scientific methods, to foresee 60  that a 
particular form of environmental degradation will cause persons to leave their place of 
residence. This condition is met with regard to climate change but also, for example, 
with regard to slow desertification or, in some cases, the risk of landslides or 
earthquakes. 
– Protective or preventive action should be the more vigorous where there is a high risk of 
significant environmental degradation and thus of a large number of environmental 
refugees. In other words, the greater the risk and scale of environmental degradation, 
the more extensive States’ protective and preventive action is expected to be. 
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  With regard to these principles see the detailed account in Epiney, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit (note 
14), 217 ff. 
60
  It is therefore not necessary for the State to be in practice cognizant of the risks in question, but it suffices that it 
has been cognizant by applying a standard of due diligence. See also in this vein and with regard to climate 
change Voigt, NJIL 2008 (note 2), 1 (11 ff). 
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– In general, the principle of proportionality should also be taken into account, such that 
the technical and economic capabilities of States should be viewed in relation to the 
(potential) damage caused. 
– State action may take effect either on the State’s own territory or on the territory of the 
injured State or the State in which questions are raised about individual rights. 
(b) Causality issues 
As already noted above, a State’s international responsibility for (potential) outflows of 
environmental refugees presupposes that a causal link may be established between the 
State behaviour in question61 and the significant environmental degradation62 responsible for 
the outflow of environmental refugees. 
A causal link is generally easy to establish where the question is one of specific State 
behaviour that is clearly the cause of a specific environmental degradation, as may for 
example be the case of industrial accidents or failure to take precautionary measures against 
certain specific events that may jeopardize the quality of the environment. 
Causality is, conversely, far harder to establish in cases where the environmental 
degradation at issue stems from a host of factors and it is not possible to establish with a 
degree of probability that one factor or State behaviour is clearly predominant or decisive in 
the environmental degradation at issue. In this particular context, that is more the rule than 
the exception. For instance, climate change stems from the emissions generated by a host of 
actors in many States. The lack of water in some regions or soil erosion also usually have 
several causes.  
In such situations, it should firstly be emphasized that the fact that many States may 
(potentially) be responsible does not “automatically” mean that international responsibility on 
the part of at least some of those States cannot be established. Indeed, in cases where one 
State’s “contribution” to the environmental degradation of itself suffices to cause significant 
environmental degradation triggering migratory flows, the causal link must in any case be 
recognized.63&64 
Furthermore, the question arises as to whether a causal link may also be recognized in cases 
where various States’ contributions to the environmental degradation at issue are themselves 
(severally) the factor that triggers a significant environmental degradation, such that only the 
cumulative effects of several States’ behaviour can produce such an effect. As this problem 
has not yet to our knowledge been raised in international practice, it must be addressed by 
referring to the basic principles of the primary obligations at issue. Two aspects should then 
be distinguished. 
– Firstly, the current state of international law does not, on the basis of practice, warrant 
recognition if an international obligation on States to refrain from behaviour that in 
themselves do not infringe any international obligation but merely have “illegal” 
consequences when combined with similar behaviour by other States. Indeed the 
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  This differs according to the primary obligations at issue. For these see IV.1 above. 
62
  Only significant environmental degradation may give rise to environmental refugees as the concept is understood 
in this paper. See II above. 
63
  See Epiney, ArchVR 1995 (note 44), 309 (354 f). 
64
  If such a cause can be defined, it is self-evident that a third State may also be held accountable, although the 
details are not yet clearly established in international law. Thus the question arises, for example, as to the extent 
to which States should take measures to impose the standard of due diligence to prevent enterprises 
headquartered on their territory from developing activities that may be environmentally damaging to other States. 
The chemical accident at Bhopal is one example in which this question was raised but has not been answered in 
international practice. In this regard, see Astrid Epiney, Union Carbide Case, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, 2009, www.mpepil.com . 
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international obligations at issue each individual State to engage in a particular course 
of conduct and it would be unacceptable for one State to be held internationally 
accountable simply because other States behave in the same way. Furthermore, in 
such a case no “direct cause” of the environmental degradation can be ascertained.64 
The damaging effects of climate change may be adduced as an example: although the 
causes of the increase in mean temperature and the resultant environmental damage 
(and consequently, possible flows of environmental refugees) are well established, the 
general rules of State responsibility do not permit one or several States in particular to 
be designated as responsible for them because the combination of effects is decisive in 
the final result achieved, namely climate warming. Consequently, it is not possible to 
“construct” the responsibility of given States in as much as one State’s emissions, 
comprising large quantities of CO2 could not suffice to cause the effects of climate 
change. 65 Furthermore, in view of the current state of international environmental law, it 
cannot be asserted that – beyond the scope of the obligations contained in treaties and 
notably in the Kyoto Protocol – States are under any obligation whatsoever to restrict, to 
whatever level, greenhouse gas emissions from their territory. In sum, harmful activities 
in themselves cannot be viewed as contrary to the international obligations of the States 
concerned inasmuch as each State’s behaviour in isolation cannot be considered to be 
the origin of significant environmental degradation. 
– Secondly, the question arises as to whether States that in conjunction are the cause of 
significant environmental degradation may be bound under international law to “repair” 
the effects of their behaviour. On first sight, this question must be answered in the 
negative since, as stated above the behaviour at issue does not in general violate any 
primary norm. However this conclusion is considered to be somewhat hasty: in our 
view, if the combined contributions of various States reach the necessary threshold, an 
obligation of proportional redress may be construed from the obligation of States not to 
cause significant environmental damage in other States, Only this approach can ensure 
that “victim” States are not left unprotected, and it is also consistent with the purpose of 
that obligation under international law. Thus States are obliged to contribute to the 
prevention of damage that might result from their behaviour in proportion to those 
behaviours and to “repair” the consequences of that damage if it nonetheless occurs. 
This obligation is, in our opinion an exception to the general rule under which States are 
not answerable for the consequences of behaviour that complies with their international 
obligations. However, it must be noted that international practice has not yet to our 
knowledge recognized such an obligation and that its standing in international law is 
thus unclear. It would be desirable for this matter to be clarified by States through State 
practice. 
V. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that the prevailing international law contains a number of binding obligations 
which (also) relate to environmental refugees and environmental degradation leading to outflows of 
environmental refugees. It would be desirable for States and international organizations to 
remember these obligations, since to our knowledge they have never or very rarely been invoked 
in the case of environmental refugees. That said, it must be observed that the international 
obligations that are relevant in our context do not specifically refer to environmental refugees. In 
that they are deficient insofar as only a fraction of the problems to which the plight of environmental 
refugees gives rise is covered by prevailing international law. In that regard, the following aspects 
should particularly be emphasized: 
– in many cases of environmental degradation, especially those relating to climate 
change, it is difficult to “designate” a responsible State. The mechanisms of 
international responsibility cannot therefore be applied application against States that 
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cause climate change the activities of emission themselves. This aspect restricts in 
particular the scope of human rights obligations, as well as States’ responsibility for 
migratory flows. However, it would arguably suffice if the various States that in 
conjunction cause a significant environmental degradation (such as climate change) 
were to bear, in proportion to their behaviour, the costs arising from such behaviour on 
the basis of the no-harm rule. It should nonetheless be noted that there is no 
international practice that interprets that principle within the meaning discussed here;  
– as regard to preventive or adaptive measures, the States in which environmental 
degradation takes place often do not possess the resources required to take adequate 
measures (which in principle also prevents them being internationally responsible). As 
regards the other States, international law contains no obligation to provide financial or 
technical support, other than the aforementioned obligations that may arise from the no 
harm-rule. Additionally, in many situations “appropriate” preventive or adaptive 
measures cannot suffice to prevent the environmental degradation that gives rise to 
migratory flows. Furthermore, in some situations environmental degradation is not 
foreseeable. 
– the principle of non-denial of entry can be deduced, on certain conditions, from the right 
to life and the right to food. However, that principle cannot generally resolve the issues 
arising from the plight of environmental refugees. There is reason to recall in this regard 
that the status of persons to whom this principle applies remains highly insecure, that its 
scope of application is relatively narrow (since a threat to human rights must be 
demonstrated in each individual instance) and that the very concept of environmental 
refugee is yet to be clarified. 
In view of these current shortcomings in international law, we consider that it would be desirable, 
and is even urgently necessary to give serious and rapid thought to the development of 
international law, leading to a specific legal instrument resolving a number of issues raised by the 
plight of environmental refugees. Such a convention should settle issues relating to the “individual 
protection” of persons obliged to leave their region of origin as a result of environmental 
degradation and provide more “collective” machinery for planning and funding.66 
                                                 
66
 See the considerations in Epiney, in Le droit à la vie, forthcoming (note 5). 
